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Abstract. This is the third in a continuing IBPP series of articles about aviation terrorism. (See IBPP Vol. 1, 
Nos. 12 and 15 for the first two articles.) It was presented at the international conference entitled 
"Aviation Communication: A Multi-Cultural Forum" on April 9, 1997 at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University, Prescott, Arizona. This article illustrates how five commonly accepted elements of aviation 
antiterrorism and counterterrorism policy usually perpetuate terrorism as opposed to attenuating it. 
 
There are the usual policy suspects to prevent and manage aviation terrorism: (1) defining the victims of 
terrorism as innocent; (2) never negotiating with terrorists, let alone giving in to their demands; (3) 
holding terrorists accountable for terrorist acts; (4) developing profiles of people likely to engage in 
terrorism; and (5) developing physical assets to achieve antiterrorist and counterterrorist consequences. 
This paper describes how each of these policies--as reasonable as they might appear to most people--
usually perpetuate terrorism, not attenuate it. And this perpetuation is the result of policymakers 
profoundly misunderstanding the psychology of multi-cultural communication. 
 
Victims as Innocents. Many national and international definitions of aviation terrorism refer to victims as 
innocents--combatants who weren't ready to fight, noncombatants who were just going about their 
daily lives oblivious to a specific political conflict. Yet to many terrorists, all victims are guilty. And they 
are guilty. The combatants who weren't ready were ready once and will be again. The noncombatants 
pay taxes to the very government that may be the terrorists' target; can be children who may grow up 
to pay taxes or be antiterrorist and counterterrorist personnel; or can be women who have the potential 
to be impregnated, carry these children to term, and nurture them. Noncombatant men, women, and 
children may give comfort and solace to antiterrorist and counterterrorist forces, forming social support 
and stress- management systems contributing to antiterrorist and counterterrorist performance. 
 
The very governments and nonstate actors that can engage in total wars over the price of oil, the 
violation of arbitrary political boundaries, and the need to turn attention from internal political 
popularity problems attribute the ultimate evil to terrorists who may be using the only effective means 
available to achieve human rights or civil rights. (This attribution often leads to insipid, culturally relative 
rebuttals such as "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." In fact, terrorism is a tool that 
can be applied to many objectives--freedom among others.) Moreover, the very governments and 
nonstate actors that attack terrorism for attacking the innocent may well engage in terrorism 
themselves, yet they persist in miscommunicating about innocence among their leaderships, among 
their followers, and towards terrorists. Not apperceiving that we are all guilty, that we all have it 
coming, leads to sanctimonious railing--a type of dysfunctional communication-- masquerading as tough 
policy. 
 
Never Negotiating, Never Giving In. Aviation terrorism is purely a psychological endeavor. Injury, death, 
destruction, or their threat is intended to achieve political objectives through intermediary psychological 
processes: fear, anxiety, terror, cowardice, lack of resiliency, the cult-like belief in nonviolent virtue. By 
stating that they never negotiate, never give in, policymakers are actually adhering to operant learning 
1
: Aviation Antiterrorism and Counterterrorism Policy
Published by Scholarly Commons, 1997
International Bulletin of Political Psychology 
2 
 
theory tenets--i.e., that the terrorist behavior will be extinguished because it is no longer followed by 
positive or negative reinforcement. 
 
However, the nature of multi-cultural communication in an era of globalization renders this policy 
impossible to effect. First, information technologies ensure that terrorist acts will become known--itself 
reinforcement as political objectives and what needs to occur to stop a specific terrorist campaign are 
publicized. Second, regardless of policy, many people--through their belief systems--will demand that 
terrorist acts be reinforced through being awarded their political objective in order to ward off future 
terrorist behavior. Some of these belief systems feature sacred or secular pacifism, others acontexual 
stupidity. Thirdly, governments and nonstate actors do negotiate and give in to terrorists regardless of 
what they communicate in public. Whether the Carter, Reagan, and Kohl Administrations with the 
Iranian government, the Netanyahu Administration with the Palestinian National Authority, the Yeltsin 
Administration with the Chechens, the Ortega Administration with the United States Government, 
Greenpeace with the French Government, the Vietnamese with the Khmer Rouge, the United Nations 
with countless governments and nonstate actors, the never-negotiating/never-giving-in policy is forever 
broken. The antiterrorist mantra--"You can run but you can't hide"-- is better invoked as "We just can't 
help it." 
 
Holding Terrorists Accountable. If terrorism can't be prevented, policymakers assert that terrorists will 
meet their just deserts. This seems a rather odd dictum from adept practitioners of plausible deniability. 
International terrorism--and aviation terrorism in particular--often is characterized by widely disparate 
actors in widely disparate parts of the world engaged in political front groups; solicitations of weapons, 
money, and safe houses; training; and the like. The more sophisticated cover covert and clandestine 
intentions with public verbal and nonverbal communications conveying the opposite intent. Examples 
include rushing victims--those whom you made victims--to hospitals, preventing some of one's followers 
from harming some of one's adversaries while other followers attempt to kill other adversaries, and 
privately creating multiple terrorist capabilities, some of which one publicly terms one's own enemies in 
the quest for peace. National policymakers often compound the problem by expelling known terrorist 
from their respective countries without formally attributing guilt--which in any case does not minimize 
future threats to these same countries. These cross-communications--for totalitarian governments and 
representative democracies alike--render it difficult to attribute blame, let alone develop, authorize, and 
implement some noxious consequence towards terrorists. Through multi-cultural communication 
dysfunctions, the terrorist may hoist the target on its own petard. No one, terrorist or policymaker, ends 
up accountable. 
 
Profiling-Usual Suspects Finding Usual Suspects. Many government commissions have recommended 
the development of lists of characteristics depicting those most likely to engage in aviation terrorism. 
The thinking is that the closer likely terrorists get to air assets, the closer they get to being greeted by 
antiterrorist and counterterrorist personnel. Besides commonly cited problems with the base rates of 
terrorists and false positive and false negative errors, there are other problems with profiling intimately 
related to multi-cultural communication. First, even if we could develop reliable and valid profiles, the 
social transformation of knowledge ensures that the reliability and validity changes through time. An 
ongoing intelligence collection and analysis capability would need to be instituted to continually support 
reworking the profiles used by antiterrorist and counterterrorist personnel. Second, profile data--in the 
continuation of the ancient game of spy-counterspy--inevitably leak so that terrorists can use the 
profiles as part of their own deceptive strategies. Also, terrorists aware of even the general effort of 
profiling attempt the random mixing of characteristics with their personnel as far as logistical and 
psychological constraints allow. Thirdly, in a variant of another ancient game--looking for one's key 
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where the light is better, not where one dropped it--most profilers analyze external physical features, 
behaviors, or demographics. Intrapsychic beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and cognitive processes may be 
more robust correlates of terrorist behavior but are more difficult to identify. Yet, some forensic 
psychologists even believe that these correlates either don't exist or are irrelevant in analyzing human 
behavior. Their professional culture leads to dysfunctional communication about the psychology of 
terrorism. 
 
Physical Assets. With new information and weapons technologies--especially in aviation terrorism--it 
becomes easier to capture or kill terrorists. Unfortunately, it also becomes easier to capture and kill 
victims and destroy material assets. And because of new information technologies, the locus conducive 
to achieving a terrorist's objective is ever increasing, rendering the antiterrorist's purpose ever more 
challenging. The use of counterterrorist assets especially often contributes to intractable conflict as it 
creates martyrs among ideological terrorists and unwitting supporters of terrorism among those of us 
who are more humane, pacifist, and prisoners of a Golden Mean in which the correct political stance is 
always in the middle--regardless of the anchor points contributing to judging a specific terrorist event. 
Fighting terrorism with terrorism--even if effective for a specific incident--reinforces the point that 
terrorism works, bizarrely, even as a means to achieve the political objective of effectively fighting 
terrorism. 
 
In conclusion, because of the above multi-cultural communication-related problems with policy, 
terrorism always has been a feature of the human condition, and luckily for researchers on terrorism, 
always will be. (See Choi, J-T. (1994.) Aviation terrorism: Historical survey, perspectives and responses. 
London: Macmillan; Report of the President's commission on international aviation security and 
terrorism. (May 17, 1990.) United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 101st Congress, 2d 
session; Wall, B. (November, 1993.) Update on recent acts of unlawful interference and industry 
initiative to combat aviation terrorism. Paper presented at the World aviation security symposium. Hong 
Kong; Wilkinson, P. (1993.) Aviation security: The fight against terrorism. Interdisciplinary Science 
Reviews, 18, 163-173.) (Keywords: Terrorism, Aviation.) 
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